Faubourg and *Centre-Ville*: The Chartrons District and the Development of the Port of Bordeaux in the Eighteenth Century

Pierre Lacour, *Vue d'une partie du port et des quais de Bordeaux dits des Chartrons et de Bacalan*, oil on canvas, 1804-1806, Musée des Beaux-Arts de Bordeaux.

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Glossary

Armateur – a merchant in the shipping business; see also *négociant*

Appointement – a type of legal document recording the result of a hearing

Bordelais – adjective referring to Bordeaux

Cave – a cellar, used to store goods and to age wine

Chai – an outbuilding unique to the Chartrons used for wine production

Échoppe – a wooden building adjoining the city walls

Faubourg – a city suburb, an exurban space

Gabarre – a flat-bottomed boat used to load or unload cargo from a larger ship

Généralité – administrative division of French territory under the monarchy

Intendant de la Généralité de Bordeaux; Intendant de Justice, Police, et Finance – a high-ranking position in the royal bureaucracy responsible for overseeing the crown's operations in Bordeaux and the surrounding province; *intendants* Claude Boucher (1720-1743) and Louis-Urbain Aubert de Tourny (1743-1757) oversaw numerous building campaigns in Bordeaux and are discussed in this thesis

Jurade – the governing, municipal council of Bordeaux; comprised of members of the aristocracy; both a legal and an administrative authority

Jurat – a member of the *jurade*

Livre – unit of currency; one pound. In mid-century Bordeaux, a sailor earned about 200 *livres* per year[1]

Magasin – a storage building, usually for colonial goods

Maire de Bordeaux – the mayor of Bordeaux

Mémoire – literally, memory; an affidavit or statement submitted as part of a legal proceeding

Octrois – a tax collected at entrances to Bordeaux; the right of a city to collect the *octrois* was granted by the crown

Ordonnance – a statutory document issued by the *jurade*

Parlement [de Bordeaux] – the judicial body overseeing Bordeaux, comprised of members of the aristocracy; both a legal and legislative authority

Pied – unit of measurement; approximately one foot

Place – city square; open space in an urban environment

Porte – literally, door; used to describe entrances in the city walls

Négociant – a wholesale merchant involved in shipping; see also *armateur*

Sénéchaussée – akin to *généralité,* an administrative division of territory dating back to medieval France

Sieur – literally, sir; used to address a man of status, a landholder, or a nobleman

Tonneaux – unit of measurement of shipping capacity; translates to casks or barrels

[1] Jean-Pierre Poussou, *Bordeaux et le Sud-Ouest au XVIIIe Siècle: Croissance Économique et Attraction Urbaine* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1983), 329.

Maps of Bordeaux



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Figure 1. Bordeaux and its surroundings before 1758, showing the separation of the Chartrons (marked in red) from the city by the Château Trompette. Author unknown, *Plan de Bordeaux, de ses fauxbourgs et d'une partie de ses environs*, before 1758.

Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France

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Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France

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Introduction: Towards a Typology of Center-Periphery Relations in the Commercial Port City

The eighteenth-century commercial port city in Europe sat at the intersection of global networks of extraction, production, and domination. A port city trading in colonial goods (chiefly sugar, cotton, coffee, and indigo) collected raw materials from a hemisphere away and redistributed them for sale and processing across Europe. Over time the city adapted to accommodate the flow of goods through its harbor, establishing and reinscribing its authority to facilitate and coordinate their movement. The rising tide of trade with and extraction of resources from European colonies across the Atlantic marked the "Age of Sail." Bordeaux, situated at a bend on the Garonne River in southwestern France, 100 kilometers inland, was well-positioned to become the largest seaport in France during the eighteenth-century.[2]

As an exemplar of the early-modern European port city, Bordeaux was special in that its trade activity originated beyond the ramparts, only later moving into the city itself. The earliest shipping took place from the shores of one Bordeaux's *faubourgs* called the Chartrons. Separated from the city by the Château Trompette (Figure 1), the first inhabitants of the Chartrons settled on its marshy terrain in the fourteenth century. While Bordeaux proper was slow to take up the mantle of international trade, the merchants of the Chartrons were responsible for the majority of transnational shipping through the early eighteenth century.[3] Bordeaux's port spanned nearly five kilometers from north to south, with the Chartrons furthest to the north and furthest downstream on the Garonne. Regulations regarding ship anchorages demonstrated that most of the cargo

[2] Angelo Olivieri, "An Urban Case History: Bordeaux," *Journal of European Economic History* 2, no. 2 (Fall 1973), 454.

[3] Paul Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais, l'Europe et les Îles* (Paris: Aubier, 1974), 16, 23, 126-7.

passing through Bordeaux was loaded or unloaded outside the city walls at the Chartrons, or along the walls facing the riverfront just upstream.[4]

The significance of commercial operations taking place beyond the city walls cannot be overstated. The *faubourg* was a generative space of many purposes and possibilities, and it is precisely the opportunities presented by the Chartrons that explained its adoption as a harbor. The metropolitan periphery, as a space morphologically between the agricultural and the urban, offered the infrastructure and opportunity to respond to the needs of new economic development.[5] Demographically speaking, *faubourgs* were composed of populations on the margin of the state and society—outsiders, foreigners, and the poor. While the eighteenth-century *faubourg* was often an industrial site,[6] its peripheral location gave it a potentiality that precipitated the development of commerce and the bourgeoisie, a symbol of the transformation between old and new.[7] The Chartrons played a unique role in the economic development of Bordeaux because it was both peripheral and central, both *faubourg* and harbor. The importance of the Chartrons came to contradict the very definition of a *faubourg* as marginal to the city.

Understanding the *faubourg* in the context of the port city requires a brief examination of the early-modern trend towards urban specialization both between and within cities. The eighteenth century was a period of transition for European cities from their medieval forms that laid the foundation for the dense, highly populated cities of the industrial era. Where the walls of the medieval city had offered the security that made commerce possible, their defensive

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[4] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux HH 67, "Ordonnance concernant le mouillage des Vaisseaux," June 16, 1749.

[5] Henryk Samsonowicz, "Les Villes d'Europe Centrale à la Fin du Moyen Age," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 43, no. 1 (1988): 173-184.

[6] Yannick Jambon, "L'Identification des Faubourgs: Origines et Espace Vécu," in *Aux Marges des Villes Modernes: Les Faubourgs dans le Royaume de France du XVIe au Début d XIXe Siècle* (Lyon: Presse Universitaires de Lyon, 2021), 24, 28, 58-59.

[7] Ana María Rivera Medina, "Les Faubourgs à l'Origine de la Configuration des Espaces Portuaires au Nord de l'Espagne (XIVe-XVIe siècle)," in *Horizons Atlantiques: Villes, Négoces, Pouvoirs*, eds. Martine Acerra and Bernard Michon (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2019), 381.

importance had declined by the eighteenth century.[8] The early-modern city was becoming a specialized city, distinguished by the role it played in its regional and extra-regional environments. Central place theory allows us to define the city based on its function within a larger network—the way it related to its hinterland, to surrounding towns, and to other cities.[9] As economies diversified and states grew, so did the multitude of roles that a city could play.

Urban specialization consequently impacted the size, occupational composition, marital structure, and other demographic trends of a city that directly correlated with and were caused by its political and economic function.[10] Capital cities differed from industrial cities which in turn differed from seaports, not only in their regional positionalities but also in the compositions of their residents. Occupation was perhaps the category in which urban distinctions were most obvious: the proportion of government administrators within a regional or state capital was greater than those in an industrial town, where most residents might work in processing textiles, while in a port city, the number of industrial workers paled in comparison to the number of sailors, financiers, and wholesale merchants. Among these specialized urban centers, the port city was unique in its orientation towards the exterior and its embedding of material networks. Port cities linked regional and global trade, facilitating the flow of people and goods across boundaries and making visible the processes of human migration.[11] At the same time, there was significant variation between different types of port cities, be they cities sprung up around naval operations, cities serving as transshipment points, as fishing ports, or as a final destination to process raw materials.

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[8] Peter Clark, *European Cities and Towns, 400-2000* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press), 128-37.

[9] John B. Parr, "Central Place Theory: An Evaluation," *Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies* 29, no. 3 (November 2017): 151–64.

[10] Robert Lee, "The Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics of Port Cities: A Typology for Comparative Analysis?," *Urban History* 25, no. 2 (August 1998): 150-1.

[11] Robert Lee and Richard Lawton, "Port Development and the Demographic Dynamics of European Urbanization," in *Population and Society in Western European Port Cities, c. 1650-1939*, eds. Robert Lee and Richard Lawton (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool University Press, 2001), 1-2, 5.

Past studies have either elided the difference between the harbor in the Chartrons and that of the city proper (as in the case of histories of its port) or they have glossed over the economic significance of the Chartrons in favor of its demographic profile. The two most comprehensive studies of eighteenth-century Bordeaux, conducted by Paul Butel and Jean-Pierre Poussou, exemplify this trend. In a seminal work, *Bordeaux et le Sud-Ouest au XVIIIe Siècle: Croissance Économique et Attraction Urbaine* (*Bordeaux and the Southwest in the 18th Century: Economic Development and Urban Attraction*), Poussou investigated in-migration to Bordeaux and the city's demographic profile across and within neighborhoods. He effectively demonstrated the predominance of maritime occupations in Bordeaux, the significant presence of foreign merchants, and the pull of Bordeaux on people from its surrounding countryside that was typical of a port city. Poussou compared the Chartrons to the rest of the city but solely on demographic grounds—that is, on the basis of the occupation, nationality, and marital status of its residents.[12] Butel's economic history, *Les Négociants Bordelais, l'Europe et les Îles au XVIIIe Siècle* (*Bordelais Merchants, Europe, and the Caribbean in the 18th Century*) situated Bordeaux within local and international trade networks. Butel described the material circumstances underpinning Bordeaux's shipping industry: its financing, the goods it dealt with, the role of its foreign merchants and their representation of and participation in a web of international trade.[13] While Butel dealt with trade in the Chartrons, he devoted little time to the built environment and the relationship between the two harbors.

This thesis aims to bridge the gap between the two and to conduct a spatial history of the Chartrons, which is to say, to uncover the specific particularities that caused the earliest harbor to emerge beyond the city walls. Chapter 1 discusses the opportunities offered by the built

[12]Jean-Pierre Poussou, *Bordeaux et le Sud-Ouest au XVIIIe Siècle: Croissance Économique et Attraction Urbaine* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1983).

[13] Paul Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais, l'Europe et les Îles* (Paris: Aubier, 1974).

environment of the Chartrons, arguing that its open access to the waterfront, coupled with exclusionary city policy directed towards both foreign merchants and certain types of wine, promoted the expansion of its shipping operations in the eighteenth century. Having established the historical affordances of the Chartrons and its harbor, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the changing relationship of the Chartrons to its government, and the contestation of power between the city government and the French crown. In response to the importance of the Chartrons and its harbor, the municipal council of Bordeaux, called the *jurade*, pressed to expand its legal authority beyond the city walls to include the *faubourg*. Chapter 2 deals with the rhetoric the *jurade* used in this expansion and particularly the role of specificity in this place-making process. Chapter 3 concerns the response of the French monarchy to the concentration of trade activity in the Chartrons, through *intendants de justice, police, et finance* Claude Boucher and Louis-Urbain Aubert de Tourny, high-ranking royal officials responsible for Bordeaux and its countryside. Their work to remake the city waterfront and adapt it to cargo operations supplanted the primacy of the Chartrons harbor. I conclude with a comparison of the different power of the *jurade* and the *intendant*, suggesting that access to financial resources explained their differing responses. I argue that the governments' reception of the Chartrons, a dynamic economic space composed mostly of foreign, non-noble merchants, and the distinction between integration and replacement was less an ideological reaction than an economic one. In other words, we must be careful not to read into the differences between city and royal administration an alliance between the crown and the bourgeoisie that did not exist, nor into the *jurade* an overwhelming attachment neither to aristocracy nor to traditionalism.

Bordeaux serves as a useful case study because it draws together numerous economic, social, and political threads of European history. Its harbor stood at a crossroads where goods

from as near as the countryside and as far as the Caribbean were unloaded, processed, stored, and re-loaded on ships bound for the rest of Europe. As an entrepôt, Bordeaux intersected material networks of ever-increasing complexity. But, until the royal government stepped in to reconstruct the harbor, these networks crossed not within the city itself but outside of its walls. While the demographic profile and the economy of the Chartrons itself have been relatively well-studied, investigations of its relationship with the larger city have been lacking. This connection between periphery and center, between *faubourg* and metropole government, made visible the tensions and transformations of the French state and economy in the last century before the Revolution.

Chapter One: The Evolution of the Chartrons and the Spatial Distribution of *Bordelais* Trade

The earliest years of Bordeaux's development into Europe's second-largest port were driven by the economic activity of the Chartrons *faubourg* just north of the city walls. To understand the spatial specificity of Bordeaux's trade economy through the development of the Chartrons, it is necessary to first deal with the overall shape of *bordelais* trade through the eighteenth century. Broadly speaking, goods moving into and through Bordeaux's port fell into three categories: wine, transported down- or upstream from the countryside to be processed for export to England and northern Europe; grain and timber imports from northern Europe; and colonial goods—primarily sugar—from French colonies in the Caribbean for re-export to the rest of Europe. The wine trade had been dominant in Bordeaux prior to the eighteenth century, in part due to the activity of the Chartrons; trans-Atlantic shipping took off throughout and especially during the latter half of the century.

The overall scale of the shipping economy grew steadily throughout the course of the century, although interrupted at times by state conflicts including the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years' War (1756-63). In 1715, 57,000 *tonneaux* (casks or barrels of goods) destined for or coming from Europe passed through Bordeaux's harbor, nearly three-quarters of Bordeaux's overall shipping; another 5,000 *tonneaux* came from or were shipped to the colonies. By mid-century (1745-49), the yearly average *tonneaux* to or from Europe was 66,827 (just over half of all trade) versus 24,333 for the colonies. The total volume of trade had risen to 250,000 *tonneaux* by the 1780s, of which European trade comprised 124,000 *tonneaux* and colonial trade 78,000. Shipping volume, and that of colonial shipping in particular, increased rapidly both in sheer quantity and in proportion of overall trade in the second half of the century.

Bordeaux's merchants profited most from the colony of Saint-Domingue (Haiti), followed by Martinique. Within the European circuit, Bordeaux's economic expansion in second half of the century served growing markets on the North Sea, most notably those in Hamburg and Holland.[14]

Wine was Bordeaux's earliest foray into international trade, because of the deep historical roots of wine production and sale within the region. Shipments of goods received from French colonies in the Caribbean were its second, growing with the construction of larger ships that made intercontinental voyages more profitable. Vessels crossing the Atlantic came to surpass a capacity of 900 *tonneaux* by the 1770s. By and large, wine production, storage, and shipping operated out of the port of the Chartrons, while colonial goods moved in and out of the main harbor of Bordeaux. In other words, Bordeaux's shipping economy varied not only with time but also across space and by the type of trade.[15] These two factors were in and of themselves connected. The wine trade took place in the Chartrons because of the limitations of the main waterfront and because municipal policy restricted the importation of certain types of wine through the city walls. Subject to protectionist city policy, only some wines could be sold within the city year-round. The combination of open access to the river and exclusionary city policy predisposed the Chartrons to become the locus of the shipping industry.

Wine exports to and grain imports from cities in northern Europe created a circular trade network that brought foreign merchants to settle in the Chartrons to oversee their affairs. These merchants were excluded from the colonial trade until 1736, when the city government extended that right beyond city residents.[16] The immigrant character of the Chartrons was due in part to legislation that excluded foreigners from living within the city walls. A sixteenth-century ruling

[14] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 17-20.
[15] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 20-23.
[16] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 125.

by the *jurade* ordered that foreign merchants could not operate within the city walls in order to privilege native French *négociants*.[17] For much of the early modern period, the majority of foreigners in the Chartrons were English merchants. Bordeaux, along with the rest of the province of Aquitaine, had been under English rule through 1453. It maintained close ties with British markets in the centuries following as a result. Beginning in the seventeenth century, however, an increase in trade with Northern Europe led to the settlement of merchants from Denmark, Hamburg, and Holland within the Chartrons. Foreign immigrants clustered together even within the Chartrons and formed their own communities of varying size. There were three main waves of foreign immigration prior to and during the eighteenth century: first from from Holland, then Hanseatic cities on the North Sea (primarily Hamburg), and last from German and Prussian cities.[18] These *négociants* were already embedded in networks of trade, particularly in routes through Northern Europe; their settling in Bordeaux was less a case of emigration than of translocation to locally manage their business.

Most of these merchants practiced Protestantism, a fact that induced some worry in city officials. In April 1711, the *jurade* compiled a list of sixty-eight merchants of foreign origin living in the Chartrons, along with their occupation and religious practice.[19] These merchants were all men and mostly young, with just under half below the age of thirty. A majority (eighteen people) hailed from Holland, followed by Hamburg (ten) and Flanders (nine). Twenty-two men worked as a "garçon de comptoir," an entry-level position in a larger shipping enterprise. Their median age was twenty-three. The twenty-seven men listed either as

[17] Johnathan Howes Webster, *The Merchants of Bordeaux in Trade to the French West Indies 1664-1717* (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1972), 12; see also *Inventaire sommaire des registres de la Jurade: 1520-1783*.

[18] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 155-63.

[19] *Archives Départementales de la Gironde*, Fonds C 4473, "Liste des noms des marchands Étrangers du pays du Nord qui demeurent à Bordeaux ou serait la Religion dont ils font et le Commerce qu'ils y font," April 1711.

"marchands de vin" or as involved in "commerce de vin" (wine trading) had a median age of forty years. In terms of religion, the men listed were overwhelmingly Protestant and Lutheran (recorded as separate terms), with only twenty-eight Catholics. Nearly a third of the individuals had arrived in Bordeaux within the past five years, with six arriving 1710 or later; two-thirds of the merchants had settled in Bordeaux within the previous twenty years.

This list demonstrated the social and financial ties underpinning foreign merchants' economic activity. Two individuals on the list had no occupation but instead were recorded as working underneath a more established merchant "to learn the language and commerce," as was the case with Jean Condradevantiz, age nineteen, who arrived in Bordeaux from Denmark in January 1711. Moreover, the number of older men (seven) in their late twenties and thirties listed as *garçons de comptoir*, even as they must have been supporting families, indicated the extent to which the shipping business was a partnered affair.[20] The outlay costs involved in long-distance, international shipping, whether from the Caribbean or to Europe, were high, given the expense to finance a ship and its repair, hire a crew, purchase and secure cargo—to say nothing of the risks inherent to sea transport. In order to defray costs, and to disperse risk, *armateurs* in Bordeaux organized themselves in shared enterprise, generally on the basis of family ties and sometimes extended nationality.[21]

The interconnected network of business interests in the Chartrons mixed public and private space. Unlike in Bordeaux proper, where buildings were oriented around interior courtyards, buildings in the Chartrons fronted the street. *Négociants* and their associates needed to be able to freely move into and out of buildings, which often combined residential and

[20] The *comptoir* referred to both the counting room as well as the trading initiative in general; *garçon de comptoir* could then mean an accountant or a partner of the group, perhaps one dealing with finances, although such specialization was rare. See Stephanie Dee Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce: Architecture and Urbanism in Eighteenth-Century Bordeaux*, Ph.D. diss., (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001), 262.

[21] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 189-92.

economic function. A typical structure dedicated its ground floor to commercial use, with residential quarters above. Built right up against the street, most buildings had one or two hallways running their length: one, called the *courrior*, solely for moving goods between the outbuildings and the quays at the waterfront; the other, called the *couloir*, for access to the commercial and residential spaces within the building itself. The commercial first floor contained, in general, the counting room and the kitchen (along with other service rooms), and on occasionally a storefront rented out to retail merchants by a *négociant*. The other two or three stories of the building comprised the living space.[22]

The Chartrons' exurban status granted merchants the freedom to build what structures they needed and adapt the built environment to their operation. To fully grasp the degree of physical specialization, it is imperative to understand the processes of wine production and storage that occurred in the Chartrons. By and large, particularly in the earliest years of the eighteenth century, settlement and trade in the Chartrons was driven by the wine industry. Since the Middle Ages, Chartrons merchants had collected and shipped wine grown both in its suburbs (mostly cultivated by city or *faubourg* residents, on land owned by religious orders) and more distant countryside (from larger estates that would later become the wine-producing châteaux of today). Grapes were ripened, pressed into wine, and fermented into the classic Bordeaux *claret*. Medieval *bordelais* merchants sold primarily to markets in Northern Europe and in England above all, the result of Aquitaine being an English holding through the 1400s.[23]

Not all wines were created equal, and the distinction between privileged and unprivileged wines further drove the settlement and economic growth of the Chartrons. Unprivileged wines

[22] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 251, 266.

[23] Sandrine Lavaud, "Bordeaux from Its Vineyards to Its Hinterland: A Regional Capital in the Late Middle Ages," in *The Urban Logistic Network: Cities, Transport and Distribution in Europe from the Middle Ages to Modern Times*, eds. Giovanni Favero, Michael-W Serruys, Miki Sugiura (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 61; Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce,* 2001, 229-33, 237.

could not be brought into the city for sale prior to a specific date in the busy holiday season, which meant that purveyors needed a place to store these wines around Bordeaux until they could be sold. Enter the Chartrons. Wines were classified as privileged or unprivileged based on where they had been produced under a policy dating back to the fifteenth century. As wine production expanded to vineyards beyond just the radius around the city walls, landowners around Bordeaux had demanded protections that privileged wines from their own estates. The distinction between Bas-Pays wines, produced around and downstream of Bordeaux, and Haut-Pays wines grown upstream of the town of Saint-Macaire, was established along the lines of allegiance during the Hundred Years War and formalized in the sixteenth century with the creation of the *sénéchaussée* of Bordeaux (encompassing the Bas-Pays) and the *généralité* of Guyenne (the Haut-Pays). While privileged Bas-Pays wines could enter the port of Bordeaux at any time during the year, unprivileged wines from the Haut-Pays were only permitted after Martinmas, on November 11.[24] The location of the Chartrons harbor outside the city walls exempted its merchants from this constraint. As a result, *négociants* in the Chartrons could freely receive and process Haut-Pays wine for reshipment year-round.

The introduction by Dutch merchants of a deeper red wine less likely to spoil when transported internationally further contributed to the growth of the *faubourg*. Prior to use of the techniques invented in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wines spoiled easily and thus had to be sold soon after production. Innovations in fermentation, assembly, and aging made for wine that could be transported over longer distances.[25] These new methods, however, required more specialized spaces of production and storage. By settling in the Chartrons to conduct their operations, these Dutch *négociants* transformed the suburb from an entrepôt into a site of

[24] Lavaud, "Bordeaux from its Vineyards to its Hinterland," 65-71.
[25] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 269-275.

production. These operations occurred in an outbuilding called a *chai,* a type of workshop designed to fit into the long, narrow lots of the Chartrons with room to produce and store wine while it matured.[26]

The *chai* was the primary site of wine production for Bordeaux *négociants*. Typically a long, rectangular building situated towards the back of the lot, the *chai* provided space for both the production of wine and its storage. Wine-growing estates sold unprocessed wine to the *négociants* of the Chartrons, who used their *chais* to finish production and sold the blended wines for a profit. Distinct from a *cave*, which was a below-ground cellar used to store wine, a *chai* was mostly, if not entirely, above ground and had architecture specific to receiving wine early in the process of fermentation and aging. Being above ground, the *chai* was warmer than the *cave* while its low shape with thick stone walls reduced humidity within the workshop. [27] High demand for all available land and the need to reduce light and air entering the workshop led to a tight, densely woven network of *chais* on the large blocks of the Chartrons, with minimal street access between buildings.

Within the *chai*, three processes took place. The first was what became known as *travail à l'anglaise*, which meant mixing together wines from the Bordeaux region with those from Spain, a practice that emerged to cater to English tastes. The blended wines then underwent a second fermentation. The next step of wine maturation was the racking process. Wine was sold from châteaux to *negociants* in barrels "on its lees," i.e., in barrels containing the sediment (lees) that occurred during fermentation. Racking, which involved slowly pouring wine from one barrel into another, removed these sediments and allowed oxygen into the casks to age the wine. Over the two-year maturation process, racking occurred twice during the first year and more often

[26] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais,* 126-8.

[27] Robert Coustet, "The Wine Trade and City of Bordeaux," *Chateaux Bordeaux,* ed. Alison Melvin (London: M. Beazley, 1989), 88.

during the second. Last, more wine was added to the barrels in order to prevent spoilage due to air pockets in the casks. Barrels were then moved underground to a *cave* to age for four to seven years, during which they were racked regularly. It was in these barrels that wine was transported overseas.[28]

Whereas within the walls of Bordeaux storage buildings tended to be square in shape, in the Chartrons *chais* were uniquely elongated. Because of space constraints within the city walls, the buildings used to store goods from overseas colonies—called *magasins*—generally comprised the entry-level floor of a building, with residential quarters above it. Using the first floor of a residential building as a *chai* was impractical: where a *magasin* was solely a place for storage, the *chai* was also a site of production. The particular requirements of the wine-maturation process for cool temperatures, low humidity, and still air meant that the space could not also double as an entryway. As for its shape, the narrow lots facing the street front constrained building of a square *chai*.[29] Lot size in the Chartrons reflected the needs of merchants to access the street front and the river. Building lots were thin and deep, maximizing the number of proprietors on a given lot with access to the street, while buildings were narrow and three to four stories tall. Proximity to the river so significantly reduced costs and labor involved in transporting merchandise to and from warehouses, and so merchants opted to build closer and closer together rather than expand outwards. As a result, blocks were large and densely packed with houses, *chais*, and other mercantile outbuildings.

Merchants settled in the Chartrons not just because they had been excluded from the city proper, but also because its built environment offered distinct advantages over that of Bordeaux. In addition to long, narrow lots that prioritized street access, most of the streets themselves ran

[28] Nicholas Faith, *The Winemasters* (London: Hamilton, 1978), 37-39; Edmund Penning-Rowsell *The International Wine and Food Society's Guide to the Wines of Bordeaux* (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), 90-93.

[29] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 258-61.

perpendicular to the water rather than parallel, easing passage towards and away from the river.[30] The lack of city walls meant that the riverbanks were less congested and moving cargo into the *faubourg* was comparatively easier. Maps of Bordeaux and its harbor from the first third of the eighteenth century provided a sense of the congestion created by the city walls and narrow banks. Jean Lattré's depiction of Bordeaux in 1733 clearly showed the unpreparedness of its harbor to accommodate any significant volume (Figures 2 and 3).[31] The city walls, marked in thick dark lines, ran right along the waterfront, leaving only about twenty meters of riverbank. *Échoppes*, wood buildings built up against the ramparts, lined these walls and left the interior streets narrow and congested. The riverbanks themselves largely lacked man-made retaining walls, with only three seawalls concentrated at the northern end of the harbor, near the Château Trompette. Compared to the embankments in the Chartrons, which were continuous along the waterfront with regularly spaced entry-points for boats at right angles, the harbor of the city itself suffered from erosion, degradation, and irregularity. As for accessing the interior of the city? Cargo had to be transported by cart through one of just eight *portes* in the walls facing the river, creating congestion competition to unload in proximity to a *porte*.

The growth of the Chartrons and the explosion of the wine trade in Bordeaux went hand-in-hand, spurred on by the settlement of merchants from cities in Northern Europe. This foreign merchant class chose the Chartrons because the land offered a unique affordance that the city did not: freedom to build on properties and lots oriented towards the street that accommodated, rather than impeded, movement of cargo, up to and including access to the waterfront. One must not be so naïve, however, to assume that the story ends here. As the Chartrons offered merchants

[30] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 258.

[31] Jean Lattré, *Plan de la ville de Bordeaux telle qu'elle etoit en l'année 1733 et dans lequel on a observé, ses differents accroissements, dedié et presenté a M. de Tourny, conseiller d'Etat* [map] (Paris: Chez Lattré, after 1733).

the license to construct a commercial environment to their liking, so too was their building a response to the lack of opportunity to be found within Bordeaux's walls. Municipal policy limiting the presence of both foreign merchants and unprivileged wines from the city carved out an economic niche for *négociants* embedded in northern European trade networks, but this was nevertheless an exclusionary policy. It was only later in the eighteenth century that both the government of Bordeaux and the crown sought to integrate the Chartrons and its economic prosperity with the city as a whole.

Chapter Two: The Regulation of the Chartrons Harbor by the City Government

Municipal power in Bordeaux rested in two bodies, the *jurade* and the *parlement.* Each was composed of wealthy, ennobled city residents. To greatly oversimplify, the *jurade* of Bordeaux oversaw city administration and the execution of royal orders, while the *parlement* functioned as an appellate court of law in the larger royal system. Although both were subject to the crown's command, the *jurade* and the *parlement* of Bordeaux each sought to carve out pockets of their own authority where they could. In addition to its role as a court, the *parlement* in eighteenth-century France was also responsible for registering and promulgating royal decrees. At times this power brought *parlements* into conflict with the provincial *intendant*, a high-ranking official in the royal administration responsible for initiating and executing the crown's will in the *généralité*.[32]

The *jurade* of Bordeaux had more success in establishing its own domain. A smaller body comprised of twelve *jurats* each representing a district of Bordeaux, the *maire,* and the *sous-maire*, the *jurade* also exercised control over the police. Relying on their administrative responsibilities as a pretext for their authority, the *jurats* enacted and enforced rules governing city life. Up to and through the Middle Ages, the city government was primarily concerned with happenings within the city walls and less with those in the *faubourgs* beyond.[33] In the early modern period, as the ramparts became less essential for protection and as population spilled beyond their boundaries, that began to change.

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[32] Alfred Cobban, "The 'Parlements' of France in the Eighteenth Century," *History* 35, no. 123/124 (1950): 66-67; Pavel Nikolaevich Ardascheff, *Les Intendants de Province sous Louis XVI*, trans. Louis Jousserandot (Paris: F. Alcan, 1909), xiii-xiv.

[33] Defining the extent of the *jurade*'s authority at a specific moment in time has historically been an imprecise exercise. The first distinction of the bounds of the *jurade*'s responsibility was in 1295, when King Phillip IV extended the council's control to include exurban spaces within about a 25-kilometer radius around the city. Control over this space, of course, meant the power to tax, rather than the regulatory relationship that emerged in the eighteenth century. See Marcel Rouxel, *La Compétence de la Cour des Jurats de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Bière, 1949), 33-40, 137-8.

As shipping grew in the Chartrons, the *jurade* sought to capitalize on the growing need for regulation to expand its legal authority over the workings of the port and over the harbor spaces in which mercantile operations took place. The Chartrons was downstream of the city harbor, positioned between it and the sea, which meant that traffic in the former impeded operations in the latter. The problem, therefore, was not just that the Chartrons was unregulated but that the chaos caused by its unregulated status posed problems for the area directly under the city government's jurisdiction. The *jurade* claimed responsibility for and control over the Chartrons by defining the harbor of the *faubourg* as part of the port of Bordeaux. The *jurade* specifically referenced the Chartrons in administrative orders called *ordonnances*, which served to express and authorize municipal power over space, even that beyond the city walls, as a natural consequence of the need to regulate port activity. *Appointements*, records of legal proceedings that were publicly posted in the port, broadened and enforced the *jurade*'s claims to exurban space. In expanding its control beyond the city walls the *jurade* signaled its acceptance of the commercial operations occurring in the *faubourg* rather than in *centre-ville*.

Ordonnances, akin to laws or executive orders, regulated port operations and expressed the authority of the city government over the the harbor. In addition to detailing the rules of the port, these documents also laid out the territory over which the *ordonnance* applied. *Ordonnances* explicitly named the harbor of the Chartrons, demonstrating not only that the Chartrons was an important part of the Bordeaux port but also that it had a separate identity. If the Chartrons were integrated with Bordeaux, if not necessarily spatially then economically and socially, what would be the need of writing that the rules apply "whether in the Chartrons or in front of the city," and will that they be published "on the river, in the Chartrons and everywhere

they must be so that no one can ignore them," as one *ordonnance* begins?[34] One of the earliest of these documents regarding the port was issued by the *intendant* Claude Boucher in 1721. In order to prevent the offloading of merchandise from places experiencing outbreaks of plague, the order began, "all boats coming to Bordeaux from downstream will anchor at the wharves of the Chartrons where there is established a guardhouse, and those coming from above cannot descend to the Chartrons without first having stopped at the wharf that is above the Porte de Pont Saint Jean," on pain of a 300-*livre* fine.[35] The *jurade* modelled future legislation off of the specificity of place-reference that Boucher made in this document.

In 1723, the *jurade* issued a more complete set of the rules of the port in a 12-page, 25-article *ordonnance*. Most of the articles of this document dealt with maintaining clear passage through the harbor, a necessity in Bordeaux where the riverbed of Garonne was prone to shifting sandbars. Article I required that all sand or stone ballast, used to balance the weight of a ship, be declared to city hall; Articles II through VIII forbade its disposal in the harbor, required that it be loaded or unloaded during the day under the watch of a city agent, and insisted that it be secured to prevent it from falling overboard. As for the ships themselves, Article IX allowed for anchorage no nearer than seventy-five feet from land to allow for free passage of smaller boats towards the shore. Article X required ships approach the shore only to load or unload cargo. Three articles of the *ordonnance* protected the wharves from becoming overcrowded, forbidding *armateurs* from leaving cargo on the quay or riverbank for more than three days. Most relevant, however, were Articles XV and XXII, in which the government specified the territory of the harbor. Article XV forbade leaving broken-down ships "in front of the Port and Harbor of the

[34] *Archives de Bordeaux-Métropole (ABM)* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux HH 67, "Ordonnance concernant le Port & Havre de la Ville de Bordeaux," December 30, 1723, 3-4.

[35] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux HH 67. Claude Boucher, "Ordonnance concernant les Abordages aux Bâteaux," September 30, 1721.

city, [or] the canal at Sainte Croix, the Anguilles & the Chartreaux." These canals, likely extending from the river into the marshy terrain of the interior, were separate enough from the port to warrant specific reference. In Article XXII, the *ordonnance* expressed that its rules apply "in the place of the Chartrons, from the Chapeau Rouge to the Bacalan and below, and…for the Quais which are in front of the City, from the Chapeau Rouge to the Manufacture and above."[36] Through specific reference to the places in which its port regulations applied, the government of Bordeaux expressed its authority over the spaces beyond the city walls that had been previously overlooked.

Both within the city walls and beyond, the *ordonnances* specified location not only through the names of places but also through reference to specific houses and properties. *Ordonnances* used features of the built environment most often in regulating anchorage locations, for which specificity was of utmost importance. In 1749, an *ordonnance* on anchorages described sections of the port as "beginning the length of the Chartrons Faubourg, opposite the Workshop of *sieur* Saige & then up[stream]." A different rule applied to each section of the harbor named, forbidding anchoring more than three ships abreast from "said Workshop to the Corderie [rope factory]," two ships from "the Corderie to the House of *sieur* Lukens," three ships from "the House of *sieur* Lukens to the rue du St. Esprit," and five ships abreast from "the rue du St. Esprit to the last Gate of the Château-Trompette that joins the Chapeau-Rouge."[37] The *jurade*'s explicit reference to the workshop owned by Saige and the house owned by Lukens suggested both that these were known sights or landmarks and revealed their need for a high degree of specificity in location. By referencing these two men and their properties by name, the government tapped public knowledge about who lived where to suit its

[36] "Ordonnance concernant le Port & Havre de la Ville de Bordeaux," 8-9, 11.

[37] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux HH 67, "Ordonnance concernant le mouillage des Vaisseaux," June 16, 1749.

need to delineate space and enforce the regulation of that space. The *ordonnance* confirmed that the most valuable space was between the Rue Saint-Esprit and the Château Trompette, in the north of the port, where five ships might anchor abreast. Farther upstream space was less valuable, and it was here that the government dedicated to dry-docks repairs to ships, between the Porte des Salinières and the Manufacture (see Figure 2). The government's ability to separate spaces of the harbor into different regulatory categories reflected its expanding power.

In regulating the Chartrons harbor as part of the larger port, the Bordeaux government legitimized its authority by connecting it to the common good. Regulating the port, the mayor and the *jurade* claimed, protected the generality from the interests of the individual. As expressed in an *ordonnance* clarifying regulation of rope attachments from 1748:

> "Besides, must we take care of a weak economy, which serves only to benefit Individuals, when the general interest is evidently harmed? And is it right to tolerate an expediency because it is a little less costly, when it brings about dire results…in taking advantage of others? …[T]o remove all pretext of equivocation on the Ordonnances that have prohibited the usage of Ropes, it is necessary to explain precisely what is permitted and what is prohibited…"[38]

The government of Bordeaux positioned itself as a protector of the public against individualism in order to justify regulation. Furthermore, the *jurade*'s language integrated them as members of this public. "Must *we*," they asked, accept the current state of affairs, of prioritizing "expediency, because it is a little less costly…?" This is not to suggest that the regulations established by the mayor and *jurade* of Bordeaux had nothing to do with solving the actual problems of the port, or that these *ordonnances* had no more substance than a power grab. On the contrary: that the

[38] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux HH 67, "Ordonnance concernant des Haussieres," October 2, 1748. In French, the text states, "D'ailleurs doit-on s'occuper d'une légère economie, qui ne tourne qu'au profit des Particuliers, lorsque l'interêt general en est évidemment blessé ? Et serait-il convenable de tolerer un expedient parce qu'il est un peu moins coûteux, lorsqu'il entraîne après soi des suites funestes, qu'on ne peut pas craindre, en se servant des autres ? Dans cet état, lui qui parle, estime que pour ôter tout prétexte d'équivoquer sur les Ordonnances qui ont défendu l'usage des Haussieres, il y a lieu d'expliquer bien précisément ce qui est permis, & ce qui est défendu…"

government made these kinds of appeals suggests that there was public sentiment to which they could appeal.

Négociants and *armateurs* had indeed requested the imposition of order on a chaotic port. In 1781, a Captain Napiar wrote to the *jurade* concerning the type of anchors and chains to be used in the port, recommending a sort that would be more reliable and more economical.[39] In 1786, a group of *armateurs* wrote to the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce complaining about the degradation of the port and its causes. They cited two issues: first, the secretive loading and unloading of ships at night, which was accompanied by ballast discarded into the river and into the passes between slips; and second, that ships carrying stone would unload it upon departure to save or balance weight, leaving debris in the harbor.[40] As indicated by these *mémoires,* in the eyes of port operators the city government of this era offered a solution to their problems. The regulation of the harbor by the *jurade* was a response to the requests of the city's merchants, in recognition of a need to organize cargo operations, but also one through which it claimed authority over exurban space.

Appointements, documents recording the result of a legal proceeding that were printed to be publicly affixed, enforced these *ordonnances.* They described the offense and recorded the imposition of a fine upon the transgressor, demonstrating how the power of the *jurade* spatially expanded alongside the growth of trade in Bordeaux. Ten *appointements*, dating from 1753 to 1785, unmasked the day-to-day assertion of the government's control over the port.[41] From the

[39] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux DD 6a, "Mémore de Sieur Napiar," October 5, 1781.

[40] *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux DD 6a, "Mémoire à la Chambre du Commerce," March 24, 1788 [Re-sent to the Generality of the Guyenne, April 28, 1788].

[41] *ABM* Fonds Ancien. In Bordeaux HH 67: "Appointement contre Gerard Meyerhuff," May 25, 1753; "Appointement contre Jean de Yager," June 25, 1769; "Appointement contre Pierre Laperche; Pierre Ceuil; Vincent Goudichea; Pierre Castaing; Legé Riviere; & François Vallette," December 7, 1779; "Appointement contre Baritaut, Maître de Bateau," January 15 1780; "Appointement contre sieur Rey, fils aînè, Maître Constructeur," September 28, 1780; "Appointement contre Guibert et Poitevin, Maîtres Constructeurs," May 16 1782; "Appointement contre Jean Hendric," June 13, 1783; "Appointement contre sieur Duffort, Maître Constructeur," July 8 1783;

infractions to which these documents responded, the information they included about the identities of the wrongdoers, the fines they imposed and the language they used, the *appointements* revealed a formalized legal process, secure in the legitimacy of its authority, with keen and specific regulatory power. Furthermore, references to the site of the transgression revealed the execution of the *jurade*'s authority over space beyond the city walls.

In appearance and linguistic structure, the *appointements* unapologetically contended the government's legitimacy in asserting its control over exurban space. First and foremost, the documents were printed at a time when the vast majority of government records—not to mention general correspondence—were written by hand. Michel Racle, a government printer, issued seven of the ten, beginning in 1780; before then, they seem to have been printed by an unspecified contractor. The documents followed the same basic structure, beginning with the seal of Bordeaux, followed by the title "Appointement de messieurs: les Maire, Lieutenant-de-Maire [or Soumaire] et Jurats, gouverneurs de Bordeaux, Juges Criminels, et de Police." This title, in large, bold, text, called explicitly upon the authority the *jurade* in the three roles that they hold: as governors of Bordeaux, judges, and police. The following two paragraphs named the *Procureur-Syndic*, or prosecutor, the defendant, and their offense. An *appointement* then listed the fine the defendant was ordered to pay, to be applied to repairing the port, charged him with the costs of court operation, and ordered that the document be "printed, read, published, and affixed in the present town and *faubourgs*, everywhere it must be done, and especially in the port and harbor of this town."[42]

"Appointement contre sieur Mendereau," October 27, 1785. In Bordeaux DD 6a: "Appointement contre sieur Lavau ainé, négociant," December 14, 1765.

[42] Seven of the ten documents include this language; the earlier documents not printed by Racle are less explicit.

In naming the defendant an *appointement* described their occupation, their ship, and occasionally the location of the infraction. Even without explicit identification, the names of the defendants hinted at their nationality. While the majority of the *appointements* addressed Frenchmen, foreigners made up a significant portion of the ships' captains. The earliest of these ten *appointements*, dating to 1753, named Captain Gerard Meyerhuff of the ship La Lucresse de Dantzic (The Profit of Danzig), referencing the city Gdansk in modern-day Poland. In 1768, the Bordeaux government charged Jean de Yager, captain of *La Poste de Bordeaux*. Yager's German name but the very *bordelais* title of his ship suggested that he was a German captain contracted to command a French ship. Two other ships may have had captains of different nationalities: a June 1783 *appointement* addressed the captain Jean Hendric—a French name—of the Helgeval. While Jean Hendric hailed from Ostend, in Belgium, the name Helgeval bore some similarity to Germanic languages.[43] Another *appointement* from 1785 against Captain Mendereau of the French ship *Le Charles* identified Mendereau as a native of Stetin, the port city of Szczecin in present-day Poland. The other professions named in the *appointements* tended to be much more French. A *négociant* named in 1765 was called Larau; in December 1779 and January 1780, two *appointements* name eight French ships' masters: Pierre Laperche, Pierre Ceuil, Vincent Goudicheau, Pairre Castaing, Legé Riviere, Francois Vallette, and Baritaut (of Castets, a township in Aquitaine, south of Bordeaux). Of the four master constructors cited in these *appointements*, all four (Rey, Guibert, Poitevin, and Duffort) had French names.

The *appointements* also indicated the sites where port regulation was enforced. Of the five *appointements* referencing the location of the transgression, three named the Chartrons. Captain Gerard Meyerhuff was "anchored in front of the Chartrons," while the *négociant* Lareau was charged regarding the placement of sand ballasts on his landholdings on the Chartrons

[43] "Helge" being a Scandinavian, German, or Dutch first name.

riverfront. Captain Mendereau anchored his ship on the "first line, near the rue Raze in the Chartrons," about two blocks north of the Château Trompette that separated the Chartrons from the rest of the city. The other two documents cited the constructor Guibert near the Porte de la Grave at the southern end of the city and the constructor Duffort on the side of the river opposite Bordeaux, called the Bastide (see Figure 2).[44] That the Chartrons, the Porte de la Grave, and the Bastide were all places on the margins of the city, and that the other documents made no specific reference to place, suggested not a pattern of unequal enforcement of the law but that specificity was only needed when an *appointement* occurred within Bordeaux's harbor but beyond the city proper. Occurrence within Bordeaux was implied until explicitly stated otherwise.

These *appointements* revealed anew the extent to which the city government of Bordeaux expanded its authority over its *faubourgs* through its control over its harbor. Despite the implication of the infraction taking place in Bordeaux stemming from the absent description, when an *appointement* did specify a location, it made the concrete claim that the Bordeaux government had a right and a duty to impose its regulatory power not just on the individual(s) listed but on the residents and workers of that place as a whole. The charging of Lavau, for example, for actions taken on his his own holdings at the water's edge in the Chartrons asserted the government's right to regulate property, public and private, both within and outside of Bordeaux—provided it affected *bordelais* trade. Furthermore, the suit against Lavau revealed the extent of the territory to which the Bordeaux government laid claim through its right to regulate its harbor. By asserting sand ballast be deposited only between the parish of Bègles, upstream of

[44] "Appointement contre Gerard Meyerhuff," May 25, 1753; "Appointement contre Guibert et Poitevin," May 16, 1782; "Appointement contre sieur Duffort," July 8, 1783; "Appointement contre sieur Mendereau," October 27 1785; in Bordeaux DD 6a, "Appointement contre sieur Lavau ainé, négociant," December 14, 1765.

Bordeaux, and the *jale*, or waterway, north and downstream of the city, the *jurade* asserted control over a distance along the riverfront of nearly five kilometers.[45]

In addition to claiming power over the territory of its *faubourgs*, by expressly and publicly sharing these documents with the city populace, and particularly with the actors of the harbor, the Bordeaux government laid claim not only to the ability to regulate the legal fabric of trade activity—i.e., respond to wrongdoing—but also to influence its all-important social network. Because the capital needed to operate a shipping enterprise was greater than could be raised by one person, the commercial environment of Bordeaux's port was dependent on associative ties between individual merchants.[46] As a result, an *appointement* that implicitly encouraged avoiding the named defendant, one that was publicly posted so that "no one can pretend to be ignorant" of the misdeed, could significantly impact the defendant's prospects. Of course, on one level a public announcement was an intuitive step to take: port workers and traders had an interest in knowing which of their own had been careless with their anchorages or with the loading of cargo. But to assume the story ends there is to assume without question the legitimacy of the charges levied against the defendants. Assessing the harms listed in these *appointements*, not to mention if they were worth the fines imposed, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the significance of these *appointements* is that they revealed how the city government, in responding to the interests of *négociants* and *armateurs*, established laws to protect the capital invested in the trade network running through its harbor. Although its ability to do so was eased by the requests of its citizens, the government went beyond these requests to claim new power over the space beyond its walls.

[45] "Appointement contre sieur Lavau," December 14, 1765.
[46] Butel, *Les Négociants Bordelais*, 189-211.

What, then, were the sorts of infractions listed in these documents and what amends did the government impose? In general, fines ranged between 25 and 50 *livres*, in some cases rising to 100. A 25-*livre* fine was not extreme, but neither was it an insignificant expense. For context, *bordelais* sailors earned around 200 *livres* per year in 1745; their salaries rose to 600 *livres* by the end of the century.[47] By and large, the *appointements* had to do with the safety and efficiency of port operations. One of the biggest issues seems to have been the presence of fire aboard ships, for which Laperche, Ceuil, Goudicheau, Castaing, Riviere, Vallette, and Baritaut were charged in the winter of 1779-80. While Baritaut was fined 100 *livres*, the rest paid 25 *livres* each.[48] Another set of *appointements* dealt with anchorages and the placement of ropes. Captain Meyerhuff faced a 25-*livre* fine for anchoring to shore in 1753, while Jean de Yager, captain of *La Poste de Bordeaux*, was arraigned in 1779 for refusing to reduce his ship' ebb cable and paid 50 *livres*; captain Mendereau was fined 25 *livres* for dropping a rope from his ship, which "nearly caused [the next ship over] considerable damage and set part of the harbor adrift."[49]

The *appointements* detailed the consequences of the misdeeds as justification for the punishment imposed. The most severe of these *appointements*, however, charged Captain Jean Hendric of the Helgeval with attaching his ship to another ship in the port, causing a collision with a dinghy that resulted in the death of three English sailors in 1783. For this malpractice Hendric was fined 100 *livres*; the second half of the *appointement* raises the fine for improperly attaching ropes to 500 *livres*.[50] Of the four "Master Constructors" named in this collection of *appointements*, each faced a charge of 50 *livres* for raising a boat up onto a pontoon for work and

[47] Poussou, *Bordeaux et le Sud-Ouest au XVIIIe Siècle*, 322, 329.

[48] "Appointement contre Pierre Laperche; Pierre Ceuil; Vincent Goudichea; Pierre Castaing; Legé Riviere; & François Vallette," December 7, 1779; "Appointement contre Baritaut, Maître de Bateau," January 15, 1780.

[49] "Appointement contre Gerard Meyerhuff," May 25, 1753; "Appointement contre Jean de Yager," June 25, 1769; May 16 1782 "Appointement contre sieur Mendereau," October 27, 1785.

[50] "Appointement contre Jean Hendric," June 13, 1783.

while Guibert was fined another 50 *livres* upon his worksite catching fire.[51] The *appointement* against Lavau in 1765 stands alone as the only case either against one of the privileged members of the *négociant* class or to have occurred on land. Having placed sand ballast on his property along the river in the Chartrons, Lavau failed to declare this to the government's *bureau du délestage,* or office regulating ballasts. He was ordered to remove the ballast within three days himself after which the government would do so at his own expense, but no fine was set.[52]

Hendric's fine seems shockingly low given the loss of life involved, but this pointed to the rigid legality of the *appointements,* which recorded rulings that were based solely on the already-existing "ordonnances and rules of the harbor police." The *appointements* thus showed how the legal doctrine of regulation was constituted in real time. If the penalty under existing laws was deemed inadequate, an *appointement* remade the law in the same document. Immediately after announcing his fine, the *appointement* against Captain Hendric ordered Hendric and "all other captains, [ship's] masters, and patrons of vessels, skiffs, and boats to tighten the ropes crossing from one side to another, or from the ship to shore, under any pretext, or risk a fine of 500 *livres*." Lavau avoided a fine because there was no law on the record to serve as pretext; perhaps even the placement of sand ballast was a new problem. The government dealt with this by ordering him to remove the ballast within three days and by laying out new regulations in the very same *appointement* regarding where ballast could be placed with a fine of 50 *livres* for contravening. These two *appointements* demonstrated the ongoing process of lawmaking through which the *jurade,* in responding to the needs of *négociants* and *armateurs* of the harbor, expanded its legal authority beyond Bordeaux's city walls.

[51] "Appointement contre sieur Rey," September 28, 1780; "Appointement contre Guibert et Poitevin," May 16, 1782; "Appointement contre sieur Duffort," July 8, 1783.

[52] "Appointement contre sieur Lavau," December 14, 1765.

The *jurade's* incorporation of the Chartrons into the legal definition of Bordeaux's port reflected the spatial importance of the *faubourg*. It also represented a reshaping of the identity of Bordeaux as a city. Prior to the eighteenth century, the urban periphery had been of little concern to the *jurade*. But in describing the port, the *jurade* explicitly included the harbor in the Chartrons as part of its regulatory domain. The harbor's growing importance in defining the boundaries of the port and thus the city itself then reduced the importance of the walls. This re-definition of Bordeaux to include its exurban territory—based on the port, rather than the city walls—changed the premise upon which Bordeaux based its identity. By expanding Bordeaux as a legal entity within which the *jurade* had authority along the length of its port and beyond its walls, the *jurade* demonstrated an acceptance of shipping operations taking place outside of the city center. As will be shown in the next chapter, the French crown took a different approach.

Chapter Three: Royal Authority and the Reshaping of Bordeaux's Waterfront

The *jurade* and the *parlement* were not the only authorities in the Bordeaux government; nor were they the most powerful. That superlative went to the office of the *intendant de justice, police, et finances*, a representative of the crown who governed Bordeaux and its surrounding province. As royal administrators, *intendants* held sway with both state and local officials. Authorized to enact a broad agenda and armed with the backing of the king, two eighteenth-century *intendants* of Bordeaux reshaped the physical form of the harbor (Figure 4). Claude Boucher, in his term as *intendant* from 1720 to 1743, initiated construction on a commercial district centered around a *place royale* that opened the city to the waterfront. His successor, Louis-Urbain Aubert de Tourny, served until 1757 and oversaw the completion of construction on the *place royale*, the migration of Bordeaux's financial and commercial institutions to the site, and the transformation of the riverfront façade. By demolishing the city walls that restricted movement between the river and the city, Boucher and Tourny removed the biggest obstacle that *bordelais* merchants faced. Where the local *jurade* and *parlement* of Bordeaux accepted the concentration of shipping activity in the Chartrons beyond the city walls, the *intendants'* power over city and royal finances allowed them to create a commercial district within the city and supplant the Chartrons' role in the urban landscape. Their ability to mobilize financial and bureaucratic resources far outmatched the capacity of the municipal government and the use of these resources to accommodate a growing merchant class, against the wishes of at least some of the local nobility, reinforced the monarchy's dominance over Bordeaux and its surrounding province.

While through *appointements* and other legal documents the Bordeaux government laid claim to external port spaces through the rhetoric of place-naming, the *intendants* and the

monarchy reconstructed the physical harbor of the city. The *intendants* stepped in to resolve the tension between the needs of the *negociants* and *armateurs* and the spatial organization of Bordeaux at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Medieval Bordeaux largely shunned the Garonne River, surrounded by thick city walls with only a select few entrances, called *portes*. The Chartrons was the only exception. But in the eighteenth century, as the volume of goods moving in and out of the port increased, the merchant class called for the government to improve access to the river from the city itself.[53]

Although comprising nearly five kilometers from Sainte-Croix to the Chartrons, the harbor itself became easily congested because of its traffic. The busiest season, autumn, could see more than 600 ships anchor offshore; in September 1785 alone, 119 foreign ships visited Bordeaux. Ships in the harbor had to wait for a chance unload their cargo, sometimes up to several weeks. Even once given the opportunity, the depth of the Garonne River prevented large ships from approaching land, so all goods had to be ferried ashore by longshoremen in flat-bottomed boats called *gabarres.* A *gabbarre* might have a capacity of 30 *tonneaux,* meaning that more than ten trips would be needed to unload a vessel of 300 *tonneaux*. Once goods had been transported ashore, they were wheeled to *magasins*, *chais*, or *caves* for storage in wagons or carts, a process costly in time and effort.[54] Passage through the city walls required passing through *portes* which served as checkpoints for customs and tax collection. In short, *armateurs* operating out of the port of Bordeaux faced two challenges: first, the challenge of loading and unloading their ship, and second, that of moving their goods from the shore into their warehouses within the city.

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[53] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce,* 181-2, 188. For complaints about the condition of the port, see also *ABM* Fonds Ancien, Bordeaux DD 6a, "Mémoire de Sieur Napiar," October 5, 1781; Mémoire à la Chambre du Commerce," March 24, 1788 [Re-sent to the Generality of the Guyenne, April 28, 1788], discussed in Chapter 2.

[54] Butel, *Les Negociants Bordelais*, 121-4.

Unlike the municipal government, which accepted the unsuitability of the main harbor and the resulting concentration of trade in the Chartrons, the *intendants* threw their weight behind a plan to improve riverfront access and adapt Bordeaux's own harbor. On some level, this response had ideological undertones. The monarchy was more concerned with France's wealth and global prestige, and less with the squabbles between a city and its *faubourgs*. By replacing aging city walls with a grandiose riverfront façade, the crown used Bordeaux to signal the country's modernity and economic prosperity.[55] Social distinction may have also played a role. The *jurade* initially expressed its resistance to opening the city walls, its members unconvinced of its necessity and uninvolved in the shipping industry. French nobility did not participate in trade, seeing it as uncouth; if a *négociant* rose to noble status, he ended his investment and participation in shipping.[56] Although nobles, could, in theory, partake in wholesale trade without loss of status, they do not seem to have done so; socio-economic studies of Old Regime France have argued that the key social distinction was less between nobility and commoner and more between those who traded and those who did not.[57]

However, the fact that primarily *foreign* merchants were profiting from the Chartrons' centrality to Bordeaux's shipping economy challenged the simplicity of distinguishing between the motivations of the *jurade* and the *intendant*. Would not the aristocrats of *jurade* have preferred to privilege the French *négociants* who requested improvements to the city harbor? The difference in financial resources that city and royal officials could access better explains their opposite responses. The *jurade* initially hesitated to accept plans for port renovation because of

[55] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 143, 166, 200-205.

[56] Gaston Zeller, "Une Notion de Caractère Historico-Social: La Derogeance," *Aspects de la Politique Français sous l'Ancien Regime* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 336-74.

[57] Colin Lucas, "Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution," *Past & Present* 60 (1973): 92.

its expense, not because they did not agree with its necessity; only when the *intendant* secured loans and legal backing from the crown could such a plan proceed.

Claude Boucher, serving as *intendant* of Bordeaux from 1720 to 1743, mobilized massive resources to renovate the port and establish a new commercial district. The first proposal for such a project had been submitted to and approved by the state bureaucracy in 1700, but rejected by the *jurade*, whose members wanted to maintain the separation between the historical city center and the trade economy at the waterfront. In 1726, when the *jurade* approved plans to construct a new quay, Boucher pushed again for a *place royale*; after threatening to hand over the rights to develop the riverbank to a private enterprise, he gained the *jurade*'s acquiescence.[58] The consequences of this were twofold: what would occur was not just a development of the harbor, building seawalls and wharves to prevent erosion and accommodate the movement of cargo, but also a reshaping of the area inland into a monumental square that projected the grandeur of the state (Figure 4). In addition to rehabilitating the port, Boucher ordered the relocation of Bordeaux's major financial and commercial institutions. Jacques Gabriel, the architect responsible for the plan, moved the Hôtel des Fermes, the customshouse, and the Hôtel de la Bourse, the stock exchange, to the *place royale*. He submitted three plans in 1729 to the *jurade* and to Boucher, two of which located the *place royale* on the waterfront. The first had an estimated cost of over 1.3 million *livres*; the second, 687,300 *livres*, and the third, with the *place* inside the city, 815,550 *livres*. In 1730 Boucher and the *jurade* approved the second plan with some modifications, and the final plans were drawn up in 1733.[59]

[58] Paul Courteault, *La Place Royale de Bordeaux* (Paris: A. Colin, 1922), 11-13, 22-3, 28-9; Richard L. Cleary, *The* Place Royale *and Urban Design in the Ancien Régime* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 157.

[59] Courteault, *La Place Royale*, 61-71; Cleary, *The* Place Royale, 161-2.

Although the city ramparts were municipal property, their adjoining structures were not. In both the interior and exterior of the city, residents constructed wooden buildings called *échoppes* that leaned against the walls and that would challenge Boucher's program of demolition. The resistance that *échoppe* owners expressed towards their seizure and demolition demonstrated the extent of the resources, both financial and bureaucratic, that Boucher dedicated to this project. Through indemnity claims and *mémoires* challenging assessed property values, proprietaries left a paper trail that documented the process of reshaping the waterfront of Bordeaux. Take, for example, a 1733 *ordonnance* from Boucher addressing the owner of an *échoppe* situated between the Porte du Chapeau Rouge and the Cour des Aides, along the stretch of wall that was to become the *place royale*. Dated to August 3, the *ordonnance* reiterated the demand of a previous *ordonnance* on July 17 and required its recipient concede the title to his *échoppe* within the next week.[60] That Boucher needed to issue a second *ordonnance* to deal with the delay of two weeks was the first clue into the resistance his plan faced.

The process of removing the *échoppes* from the city walls was a bureaucratic and financial undertaking that could only have been done by an *intendant* with royal backing. Architects' reports, estimating the value of the *échoppes*, revealed the details of these buildings and the ways in which the owners pushed back against the government's seizure of their property. Architect Jean Jaugeon, representing the government of Bordeaux, evaluated four *échoppes* in May and June of 1732 that varied in both construction style and price. These estimations, part of the process to assess and compensate property owners, were co-signed by Jaugeon and another architect representing the proprietary. As justification, the reports cited the

[60] *Archives Départementales de la Gironde* Fonds C 1171, Claude Boucher, "Ordonnance addressé aux propriétaires des Échoppes," August 3, 1733.

an order from Boucher dated to March 14, 1732.[61] In form, then, these records demonstrated the bureaucracy involved in the transformation of the waterfront that Boucher ably turned to suit his will; in content, they indicated the variety contained in the terminology *échoppe*, the sizes and styles of buildings that these city walls took up, and the financial resources it took to remove them.

On May 17 Jean Jaugeon and Leonard Pallot reported on an *échoppe* against the city walls worth 180 *livres*.[62] They examined the structure, belonging to "the widow Bonnet," on the basis of the value of its construction. The *échoppe* was nineteen *pieds* in width, sixteen and a half *pieds* in length along the street and thirteen *pieds* high. Jaugeon and Pallot reported the existence of a bedroom above a *boutique* (storefront) eleven *pieds* long. The façade of the building was nineteen *pieds* long and six *pieds* high, and the structure as a whole had two windows and one fireplace. A second *échoppe* adjoined the first, evaluated by Jaugeon and Pierre Vallet at 140 *livres*.[63] This *échoppe* was thirteen *pieds* wide, a little more than seventeen *pieds* deep, and just over thirteen *pieds* in height. As with the previous *échoppe* this structure contained a boutique and a bedroom all on one floor, separated by two walls. The entrance to the *échoppe* was a single door into the *boutique*. As one-story, two-room structures, these buildings constituted the lower end of the *échoppe* valuations. The low prices assigned by Jaugeon demonstrated the frugal nature of the materials, if not the lack of value the buildings had to their owners, and the informality of the settlements in the eyes of the government. These were the types of buildings that Boucher found easy to remove to construct his *place royale*.

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[61] *ADG* Fonds C 1171, Jean Jaugeon and Pierre Tranchand, "Évaluation de l'échoppe du Sieur Natieu," June 18, 1732, 1.

[62] *ADG* Fonds C 1171, Jean Jaugeon and Leonard Pallot, "Évaluation de l'échoppe de la veuve Bonnet," May 17, 1732.

[63] *ADG* Fonds C 1171, Jean Jaugeon and Pierre Vallet, "Évaluation de l'échoppe de la demoiselle Jagoue," May 19, 1732.

By contrast, the two *échoppes* Jaugeon evaluated in June of the same year were more formally constructed, which required more compensation to claim the properties. Both reports were co-signed by Jaugeon and another architect, Pierre Tranchand. The first *échoppe* belonged to a merchant named Legere.[64] Jaugeon and Tranchand reported its measurements at thirty-five *pieds* in length along the street, thirty-nine *pieds* in height, and just seven and a half *pieds* of depth. The structure stood at three stories, with both a *cave* for wine and a cellar for storage of other commodities. Built from pine planks from Flanders, the *échoppe* was a physical example of mercantile influence on Bordeaux and the position of its merchants at a nexus of international trade. Jaugeon and Tranchand evaluated the building at 6,400 *livres*.

Jaugeon and Tranchand disagreed on the second *échoppe* they evaluated that month, on the rue du Vielle Corderie.[65] (This was the only *échoppe* listed by street, which suggests that the other three *échoppes* may have been located on the exterior side of the walls, facing the river.) This *échoppe* was twenty-five *pieds* long and slightly more than eleven *pieds* deep, with a façade twenty-nine *pieds* in height, including eight *pieds* of foundation. As with the other *échoppe* it contained two *caves*, one for of wine and one for various merchandise. Built from wood from Holland and Flanders, the *échoppe* consisted of a first floor and an attic in addition to its cellars. Jaugeon and Tranchand evaluated the building itself at 3,350 *livres*, but left the question of the lot itself unresolved: Jaugeon estimated its worth to be 1,800 *livres*, Tranchand at 3,000. The difference in the pricing evaluation of these two structures and the previous two indicated the fluidity of the term *échoppe* at this moment in time. If an *échoppe* could be worth little more than a hundred *livres* or well over 6,000, it presented a problem for the classification and even removal of these *échoppes* from the city walls.

[64] *ADG* Fonds C 1171, Jean Jaugeon and Pierre Tranchand, "Évaluation de l'échoppe du Sieur Legere Marchand," June 17, 1732.

[65] Jaugeon and Tranchand, "Évaluation de l'échoppe du Sieur Natieu."

While the main thrust of Boucher's initiative to redevelop the port focused on the city walls, the plan demanded changes to the interior as well. The owners of these buildings were better equipped to resist the imposition with more success. Such was the case with a 1723 *mémoire* addressed to the *parlement* of Bordeaux on behalf of a Sieur Penicaut, protesting the compensation he had been offered.[66] Penicaut rejected the 4,000 *livres* of indemnity provided, arguing that the outbuildings on his property had been overlooked. Establishing the value of his property meant establishing the class of Penicaut's potential renters. With the buildings adjoining the house, Penicault argued that the property could suit "personnes de toute forte d'état" —that is, members of the nobility and persons of high social and fiscal status. To this end, in addition to the house, the property held "a shed, a stable of six strong carriage-horses with a granary holding 10 to 12 cartloads." Furthermore, Penicaut wrote that "a *négociant* would find there sufficient store-rooms for both dry and wet merchandise brought in from the River."

Proximity to and sight of the river further contributed to the property's value through which Penicault challenged the estimation. His property had "one of the most happy and pleasing views of the river of all," but "by the building of the Hôtel des Fermes this house cannot be rented except to private persons," Penicault complained. The construction would close the street to his property, making it so that "people of business and of commerce cannot live in this house." Penicaut concluded that his house "will be without view and without benefit by the proximity of the walls of the city and the elevation of 40 to 50 *pieds* of the Hotel des Fermes." Given the costs of the property at "15,000 *livres* to build and which is shared among his children valuing 30000 *livres* and carrying no more revenue than 4 or 500 *livres* of rent," Penicaut closed with the plea

[66] *ADG* Fonds C 1171, Sieur Penicaut, "Mémoire Pour Mr. Abraham Vital au sujet de l'ecurie, remise et grenier a soin qu'on veut demolir pour l'hotel des fermes de Bordeaux," 1723.

that the the city "have Regard in the Evaluation which will be done" and not construct the new Hôtel des Fermes on the street by his property.

Penicaut's petition to the *parlement* of Bordeaux contained several rhetorical moves that appealed to and thus indicated what was of importance in the renovation of the port. First, he argued that the worth of his property came from the fact that it could be rented to people of rank. While the site's proximity to the river and its *magasins* made it ideal for a *négociant*, the uses of its outbuildings made it well-suited to a nobleman. Although Penicaut bolstered his argument by expressing the rentability of his property, increasing the income for which he could be compensated, he undercut himself at the end by writing that the property brought in no more than 500 *livres* of rent. His petition, then, cannot simply be read as a request for greater compensation. Penicaut's goal was to prevent the demolition of his buildings and the seizure of his property. In order to do so, he had to establish the importance of his holdings to the economic and social fabric of the city, not just their monetary value. Penicaut's second rhetorical move was to express the importance of the river and connect the purpose of his buildings to the proposed plan to open the city to the waterfront. The Garonne was "a considerable article" in the value of the house, given its view and access to the waterfront. In somewhat circular logic, Penicaut used the value of the river to contest a plan to increase the access of the general public to the shore. The financial resources at the disposal of the *intendant* meant that, for proprietaries like Penicaut, simply asking for greater compensation was not effective.

And it was in the financing to construct the *place royale* that the difference in power of the mayor and the *jurade* compared to the *intendant* became most visible. The *intendant* had access to royal revenue sources that made the project to open the city to the river possible where the *jurade* could not do so. The city government was funded mainly through levied taxes, the

deniers patrimoniaux, and a tax called the *octrois*, collected on goods entering the city. While the *deniers patrimoniaux* were set by the city government, the crown granted a city the right to collect the *octrois*.[67] However, tax collection was slow and raising the rate was unpopular. Given these challenges, securing funding for public projects, like Bordeaux's *place royale*, meant receiving a loan from the king in addition to raising the *octrois*.[68] To pay for the renovations at the *place royale*, Boucher borrowed from funds originally earmarked as indemnity payments for an earlier expansion of the Château Trompette, the fortress at Bordeaux's northern walls separating the city from the Chartrons.[69] Boucher's renovation of the port indebted Bordeaux to the crown, economically tying the province to the capital. His ability as a representative of the monarchy to plan for and obtain royal financing eased the way for his plan to redevelop Bordeaux's waterfront.

Intendant Louis-Urbain Aubert de Tourny's mid-century renovations of the riverfront façade served, in part, to improve collection of the *octrois* by improving passage through the city's *portes*. Tax officials worked out of the *portes* in the city walls, collecting duties on the goods moving into the city. The need to expedite this process prompted the repair and widening of other *portes*, not just the entrance at the *place royale*. Tourny, who had previously been the *intendant* of Limoges, served in Bordeaux from 1743 to 1757. He built upon the improvements proposed and begun by Boucher, enacting new plans for the architecturally grandiose riverfront façade for which Bordeaux is known today. The Porte des Salinières, central to the harbor, was the focus of *intendant* Tourny's plan to improve tax collection and harbor operations. As one of the main sites for the collection of the *octrois*, the *porte*'s recessed location and poor condition

[67] Rouxel, *La Compétence de la Cour des Jurats de Bordeaux*, 151-3.
[68] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 193-6.
[69] Cleary, *The* Place Royale, 45.

created congestion and opportunities for smuggling (see Figure 4).[70] In 1750, Tourny authorized a rebuilding program that transformed the Porte des Salinières into a wide public *place* under a new name, the Porte de Bourgogne. The Porte de Bourgogne stood at the center of Tourny's new façade, south of the Porte des Portanets (rebuilt in 1752) and the Porte du Pont Saint Jean (rebuilt in 1754). The repairs to and reconstruction of these three *portes* vastly improved the government's ability to collect the *octrois*.[71]

In addition to improving *portes* to ease collection of the *octrois*, Tourny also renovated the weighing hall, called the Halle aux Poids. While the building remained at the same location, Tourny directed its enlargement to nearly 14,000 square meters. Tax farmers collected duties on behalf of the crown on imported goods at the Halle aux Poids, but only had one scale with which to weigh until 1738 and lacked a portable scale until 1785; the Halle was thus a source of delays and many complaints. Other merchants took issue with its small size, which meant that goods awaiting evaluation had to be left on the street, risking loss or theft. In 1749, *négociants* and tax farmers petitioned Tourny asking for the weighing hall to be rebuilt.[72] The new Halle aux Poids, increased in size and housing two scales, was also made more easily accessible by the opening of new streets leading toward the waterfront and along the façade. These improvements sped up weighing, facilitated the movement of cargo into and out of the weighing hall, and thus facilitated crown's ability to collect taxes from Bordeaux's burgeoning trade economy.[73]

The role of the monarchy, through *intendants* Boucher and Tourny, in spatial histories of Bordeaux's port cannot be overstated. While the *jurade* expanded its legal control over the harbor beyond the city walls, the *intendants* concretely reshaped the harbor itself, transforming

[70] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 160.
[71] *ADG* Fonds C 1247, Royal arrêt concerning the riverside façade, July 10 1750; "Extrait des registres de l'Hotel de ville," January 10, 1754; Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 181-4.
[72] *ADG* Fonds C 1232, Machault, "Lettre à Intendent de Tourny," December 4, 1749.
[73] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 160-2, 178-9.

the waterfront into one that facilitated, rather than hindered, the movement of cargo. To construct the *place royale* Boucher exerted the full force of royal might against inhabitants of *échoppes* of varying value and permanence. His ability to enact the seizure of land and property, which required both financial and bureaucratic investment, revealed the extent of the power he had to reshape space. Where Boucher created a new commercial district, Tourny developed a riverfront façade that reflected the grandeur of the French state while improving the city and the crown's ability to profit from Bordeaux's growing economy. By improving both city *portes*, where the *octrois* was collected to fund the municipal government, and the Halle aux Poids, whose collections when to the crown, Tourny ensured the mutual investment of the royal government and the *jurade* in the renovations. Thus while the power of the *intendants* over the physical space of Bordeaux's harbor may have been more concrete than the legal claims of the *jurade*, both the royal and municipal governments were able to use this moment of prosperity and need for regulation to spatially redefine Bordeaux.

Conclusion: The Continuing Significance of the Chartrons

The degree to which shipping occurred outside of Bordeaux's city walls, from the earliest days of its dominance as a global entrepôt, set it apart from other major ports. The different responses of the local and royal government to the growing prosperity of Chartrons merchants demonstrated conflicting desires to capitalize on and extract the wealth of these merchants, on the one hand, and to maintain separation between foreign and French, Protestant and Catholic, on the other. Even as the *jurade* established its regulatory authority over the *harbor* of the Chartrons, it took no steps to integrate the *faubourg* itself with the rest of the city. At the same time, through port renovations to create a commercial district and ease the passage of goods through the main harbor, *intendants* Claude Boucher and Louis-Urbain Aubert de Tourny sought to supplant the Chartrons in its role as the primary harbor.

The power differential between the *intendant* and the *jurade*, rather than ideology, explained their different responses to the location of the harbor beyond the city walls. The *intendant*, through his access to the crown's financial resources, could renovate the riverfront and draw trade into the city whereas the *jurade* could only hope to regulate its external operations. The *jurade* was content to allow shipping to continue primarily in the Chartrons, as long as it could be assured of maintaining control. This was the impetus behind their legal rhetoric that explicitly defined the Chartrons as part of the port of Bordeaux, and one that reflected the tensions between the historical economy of the city and the changes threatened by the global shipping industry. In contrast, the royal government, through *intendants* Boucher and Tourny, saw in the rise of trade an opportunity to build national wealth and prestige for France on the global stage. By opening the city to the waterfront, moving commercial buildings to the

river, and constructing a majestic façade, they made Bordeaux the figurehead of a new, modern France.

Despite the improvement of the main harbor, the Chartrons continued to grow in size and population through the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. As a result of the existing concentration of mercantile operations and its specialized morphology, the Chartrons remained a major nexus of Bordeaux's shipping industry. The historical use and adaptation of its buildings to wine production meant that a strong incentive would have been required to induce merchants to move their operations into the city where buildings had not yet been specialized. Easier access to the waterfront was not enough—the same opportunities already existed in the Chartrons. Moreover, the city lacked the long, low, narrow *chai* that was unique to the Chartrons and allowed a *négociant* to blend, re-rack, ferment, and age wines at appropriate temperatures and humidity. Neither the *magasins* used to store colonial goods nor the *caves* of the city would have been suitable. Lastly, enduring restrictions on the sale of unprivileged Haut-Pays wines meant a continued need for exurban space for their storage. So the Chartrons remained at the center of the international trade of *bordelais* wines even as the harbor of Bordeaux became more accessible.[74]

At the same time, the replacement of the Château Trompette with a grand *place* at the turn of the century removed the greatest barrier to the integration of the Chartrons and Bordeaux. The château had separated the *faubourg* from the rest of the city, both a physical symbol of and contributor to their division. Demolition began in 1785, halted in 1787, and was finally completed in 1818. Only with this step, and with the recognition of the ineffectiveness of urban fortifications that it signaled, did the Chartrons truly become part of Bordeaux. Although in some ways still set apart by the new *place* and the neighboring public garden, these spaces could now

[74] Whitlock, *Between Crown and Commerce*, 280-291.

be traversed on foot (Figure 5). The population of the Chartrons grew significantly during this time with both foreign and French residents. Parochial censuses in 1790 recorded 15,617 inhabitants in the Chartrons—a definitive undercount of the total population, given that this figure would have omitted the sizeable proportion of Protestant residents—versus 23,361 in the riverfront parishes within the city, which were the most similar in economic composition.[75]

Bordeaux and the Chartrons demonstrate the intricacies of spatial history. Beyond just a matter of resources, of transportation costs or production opportunities, economic change and spatial concentration involved infinitely complex legal and cultural factors. In the case of Bordeaux, the combined exclusion of both foreign merchants and unprivileged wines from the city gave northern European *négociants* a near-monopoly over the wine trade, one that concentrated shipping in the harbor of the Chartrons. Where Bordeaux's harbor was unprepared to accommodate a large volume of cargo, the merchants of the Chartrons adapted and developed the *faubourg* to suit their own needs. The role of regulation was as insufficient to integrate the Chartrons with the rest of the city as it had been successful in developing the Chartrons in the first place. The built environment, through the city ramparts' separation of city from river and center from periphery, maintained this distinction even against the efforts of city officials. It would take the crown, and the *intendants'* access to royal coffers, to address the physical barriers between the city and its main harbor, while the separation of Bordeaux and the Chartrons would only be resolved in the century following. But the city would never again experience the relative prosperity it did in the eighteenth century. Disrupted by the independence of Saint-Domingue (Haiti), the abolition of the slave trade by mid-century, and the effects of the Napoleonic Wars, *bordelais* trade never regained its regional or global dominance.

[75] Poussou, *Bordeaux et le Sud-Ouest au XVIIIe Siècle*, 32-3. Of the four riverfront parishes, two (Saint-Michel, 14,181 inhabitants, and Saint-Pierre, 1,649) were entirely within the city walls. Sainte-Croix, to the south, counted 1,928 urban residents. In Saint-Rémy, 2,593 residents were counted in the city and 15,617 in the Chartrons.

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